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CAVEAT EMPTOR: REAL PROPERTY LAW’S “GET OUT OF 
JAIL FREE” CARD V. THE PROPERTY CONDITION 
DISCLOSURE ACT 
Alessandra E. Albano* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of caveat emptor, or the real-life “get out of jail 
free card,” is a common law doctrine that traces back to our English 
roots and greatly influenced many state laws over time.1  The premise 
of “let the buyer beware”2 was replaced by legislation in many states 
requiring disclosure statements in the purchase and sale of residential 
real property.3  While the use of the doctrine varies from state to state, 
it was regarded favorably in New York until the adoption of new 
legislation approximately eighteen years ago.4   
In New York, the remnants of the doctrine of caveat emptor 
can be seen today, as the state has taken a different approach from its 
old roots.5  Before March 1, 2002, New York was considered a caveat 
emptor state, in which it abided by the traditional common law doctrine 
on all matters regarding the sale of residential real estate.6  The 
doctrine imposed “no duty on the seller to disclose any information 
concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length unless 
there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2021, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Business 
Administration, St. Joseph’s College – Long Island.  I would like to thank Professor Rena 
Seplowitz for providing unlimited guidance and support throughout the writing process.  I 
would also like to thank Howard M. Stein, Esq. and the entire Real Estate Department at 
Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP for igniting my interest in this area of law.  
1  Cendant Mobility Financial Corp. v. Asuamah, 285 Ga. 818, 819 (2009). 
2 Id. 
3 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462 (McKinney 2019). 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
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concealment.”7  The doctrine of caveat emptor further states that to be 
successful in an action for active concealment, the purchasing party 
must prove that the selling party thwarted the purchasing party’s 
efforts in fulfilling its due diligence.8   
The New York legislature’s enactment of the Property 
Condition Disclosure Act (the “PCDA”) on March 1, 2002, altered the 
way New York viewed residential real property transactions.9  Here,  
each seller must furnish the purchaser with a truthful and complete 
Property Condition Disclosure Statement (the “PCDS”).10  The PCDA 
gives more power to the purchasing party to obtain accurate 
information.11  If the premises differ from any of the responses on the 
form, the seller would be liable.12   
The use of the PCDA allowed for the doctrine of caveat emptor 
to be diminished.13  However, Section 465 of the PCDA recalls the 
common law doctrine.14  This section allows sellers to opt-out of 
providing purchasers with a PCDS by giving purchasers a five-
hundred-dollar credit at closing.15  This credit resembles liquidated 
damages because the purchaser cannot sue a seller for any other defects 
or deficiencies regarding the property.16  The reestablishment of the 
doctrine of caveat emptor creates a seller-centric selling environment. 
This Note will focus on the PCDA’s impact on residential real 
estate transactions from both a seller’s standpoint and a purchaser’s 
standpoint.  It will address the PCDA’s initial shift of liability from the 
purchaser to the seller.  It will further address how the inclusion of the 
opt-out option subsequently shifts the liability back to the purchaser.  
Furthermore, this Note will discuss the irrelevancy of the PCDA with 
the inclusion of the opt-out option.   
This Note will be divided into nine sections.  Section II will 
discuss the common law doctrine of caveat emptor and its applicability 
in New York.  Section III will examine the well-known New York 
 
7 Id. at 504. 
8 Id. 
9 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 462-65 (McKinney 2019). 
10 See id. § 462.  This forty-eight-question form outlines property conditions. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. § 465. 
15 Id. § 465(1). 
16 See generally id. § 465. 
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Appellate Division case, Stambovsky v. Ackley.17  Section IV will 
provide an overview of the PCDA and explore the legislative intent 
behind the PCDA.  Section V will explore the “opt-out” option 
included in the PCDA.  Section VI will analyze the impact of “as-is” 
clauses.  Section VII will discuss similar legislation in other states.  
Section VIII will examine the relevance of the PCDA with the 
inclusion of the “opt-out” option.  This section will also recommend 
changes to the PCDA for the future.  Finally, Section IX will conclude 
the Note. 
II.  CAVEAT EMPTOR AND ITS APPLICABILITY IN NEW YORK 
The doctrine of caveat emptor is a longstanding rule within 
traditional English law.18  This doctrine acts as a warning to purchasers 
to beware of potential problems lurking in the shadows of their future 
purchases.  In New York, the doctrine of caveat emptor heavily 
influenced the state’s residential real property laws.19  Under the 
doctrine, it shows that a seller has no duty to disclose any information 
concerning the property when dealing at arm’s length unless there is a 
confidential, fiduciary relationship or the conduct of the seller rises to 
the level of active concealment or material misrepresentation.20  
Furthermore, “to maintain a cause of action to recover damages for 
active concealment in the context of a fraudulent non-disclosure, the 
buyer must show, in effect, that the seller thwarted the buyer’s efforts 
to fulfill the buyer’s responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.”21  A duty to disclose also arises in the case of negligent 
 
17 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1991). 
18 Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed? – Doubting the Demise of Caveat 
Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (1996). 
19 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Rubin, 861 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008); Simone v. 
Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 840 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007); 
Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001); London v. Courduff, 
529 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988). 
20 Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 675; Platzman, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 504.  A fiduciary 
relationship is “one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity 
and fidelity of another.”  Holmes v. Lorch, 329 F. Supp. 2d 516, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting 
Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904-05 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976)).  Examples of 
fiduciary relationships include attorney/client relationships, principal/agent relationships, and 
trustee/beneficiary relationships. 
21 Mancuso, 861 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008) (quoting Simone, 840 
N.Y.S.2d at 400). 
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misrepresentation22 and fraud.23  Generally, mere silence does not 
amount to active concealment unless there is some accompanying act 
in which the seller attempted to hide the truth surrounding the 
property.24 
A.  The Purchaser’s Burden of Proof 
Sellers generally favor caveat emptor because the burden of 
proof falls on the purchaser to show misrepresentation, concealment, 
or fraud.25  In Mancuso v. Rubin,26 the plaintiff purchaser entered into 
a contract for the sale of a single-family home.27  The purchaser was 
responsible for obtaining an engineer’s inspection report.28  The 
engineering company completed the inspection and claimed that there 
was no evidence of termite infestation or termite damage.29  After 
closing, the purchaser discovered termites and commenced an action 
against the seller for fraudulent concealment and breach of contract.30   
The court found that the purchaser’s contentions were not 
viable.31  Generally, to prove fraud, the purchaser has the burden of 
proof using facts.32  Here, the court stated that the purchaser’s claim 
was merely a conclusory allegation because the purchaser did not 
provide evidence of concealment by the sellers.33   
 
22 See Sample v. Yokel, 943 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012).  Negligent 
misrepresentation requires proof of three elements: “(1) the existence of a special or privity-
like relationship imposing a duty on the defendant to impart correct information to the 
plaintiff[s]; (2) that the information was incorrect; and (3) reasonable reliance on the 
information.”  Id. 
23 Id. at 697.  “[T]o establish a cause of action for fraud, plaintiff[s] must demonstrate that 
defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact upon which plaintiff[s] justifiably relied 
and which caused plaintiff[s] to sustain damages.”  Id. (quoting Klafehn v. Morrison, 906 
N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010)). 
24 See Anderson v. Meador, 869 N.Y.S.2d 233, 237 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008). 
25 See generally 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:26 (4th ed. 2019). 
26 861 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008). 
27 Id. at 81. 
28 See id. 
29 Id.  Because it is difficult to find termites, the engineering company disclaimed liability 
if termites were subsequently found. 
30 Id. at 81. 
31 Id. at 83. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  Also, the court held that the “as-is” clause in the contract for sale precluded the 
purchaser’s breach of contract claim.  Id.  In addition to the “as-is” clause, the doctrine of 
merger controlled.  Id.  The doctrine of merger states that all representations, documents, and 
4
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The doctrine of caveat emptor instructs the purchaser to beware 
of all property conditions prior to closing.  The purchaser has the 
burden of inspecting the property to investigate defects and 
inconsistencies.34  When dealing at arm’s length, a seller does not have 
a duty to disclose any property defects.35  However, a seller cannot 
fraudulently conceal defective property conditions to deceive the 
purchaser.36 
B.  A Purchaser’s Duty to Exercise Due Diligence 
When purchasing residential real property, a purchaser’s 
obligation to exercise due diligence is essential.  In Schottland v. 
Brown Harris Stevens Brooklyn, LLC,37 the plaintiff purchased a home 
in 2010 and later commenced an action for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation.38  After closing, the purchaser discovered an 
easement on the property, which was properly recorded in 2003.39  The 
court found for the seller because the purchaser should have exercised 
due diligence in attempting to discover the easement before closing.40  
The court stated: 
Where the facts represented are not matter peculiarly 
within the party’s knowledge, and the other party has 
the means available to him of knowing by the exercise 
of ordinary intelligence, the truth of the real quality of 
the subject of the representation, he must make use of 
those means or he will not be heard to complain that he 
was induced to enter into the transaction by 
misrepresentations.41 
 
forms merge under the deed and, if not present within the written deed, such provisions are 
excluded.  See Hunt v. Kojac, 666 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1997). 
34 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:32 (4th ed. 2019). 
35 See Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
36 See id. 
37 968 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013). 
38 Id. at 91. 
39 Id. at 91-92. 
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The seller properly recorded the easement.42  Therefore, the 
purchaser had all available means to discover the easement before 
purchasing the property.43 
A purchaser’s duty to exercise due diligence plays a vital role 
in purchasing residential real property.  In Rosenblum v. Glogoff,44 the 
purchasers entered into a contract for the sale of a Manhattan co-op.45  
The plaintiff purchasers commenced an action against the defendant 
sellers, alleging that the sellers materially misrepresented that the 
apartment had “through wall air conditioning,” when, in fact, only two 
rooms had it.46   
Before their June closing, the purchasers were conducting a 
final walk-through and noticed the apartment’s high temperature.47  
The sellers’ broker told the purchasers that the air conditioning unit 
was located in the living room cabinet.48  However, the purchasers did 
not find the unit there.49  The purchasers then tried to cancel the 
contract.50   
The court held that the purchasers had every means of 
investigating the air conditioning system, or lack thereof, before 
entering the purchase and sale agreement. 51  With this, there was no 
evidence of concealment.52  The sellers did not thwart the purchasers’ 
“effort to fulfill their responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat 
emptor,” and the purchasers “had the means to discover the truth by 
the exercise of ordinary intelligence.”53  Furthermore, the court held 
that because the purchasers defaulted, they breached the contract.54  
Thus, the sellers were able to retain the purchasers’ down payment.55 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 92-93. 
44 932 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2011). 
45 Id. at 763. 
46 Id.  The purchasers initially visited the apartment during the winter months and inquired 
about the air conditioning system.  Id.  The sellers’ broker explained that there existed “through 
wall air conditioning,” except in the kitchen.  The purchasers claimed reliance on the broker’s 
word.  Id. 
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Exercising due diligence is a formal way of saying that 
purchasers must “do their homework” before entering into a contract 
for sale.  Inspection is the most common way to satisfy the duty of due 
diligence in caveat emptor cases.56  The previous cases show how each 
purchaser did not exercise due diligence.57  As such, the doctrine of 
caveat emptor allowed the courts to find for the sellers.   
C.  Exceptions to the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor 
While the doctrine of caveat emptor has a broad application in 
traditional common law, the doctrine would not apply if there is 
evidence of fraudulent concealment.58  A seller, who the court finds 
engages in such misconduct, loses the benefit of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.59  In Delano v. USA Home Inspection Servs.,60 the purchaser 
chose to have the property inspected before entering into the sales 
contract.61  In the inspection report, the inspector noted that the home’s 
heating system was working.62  However, after closing, the purchaser 
discovered that the heating system was disconnected in various places 
and sued the sellers for fraud.63   
The court held that “the doctrine of caveat emptor has been held 
not to apply in instances where a party has been found to engage in 
active concealment.”64  Here, the sellers disguised the connection of 
the heating system by finishing and painting the walls where the 
heating system was disconnected, in addition to carpeting the floor.65  
Furthermore, the sellers installed register vents in the walls to give the 
impression that the system was connected.66  The court found this to 
be active concealment for which the sellers were held liable.67   
Typically, it is the purchaser’s responsibility to research and 
investigate the property prior to entering the sales contract.  However, 
 
56 See cases cited supra note 33. 
57 See, e.g., Schottland v. Brown Harris Stevens Brooklyn, LLC, 968 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2013); Rosenblum, 932 N.Y.S.2d 763. 
58 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:29 (4th ed. 2019). 
59 See infra note 60. 
60 841 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2007). 
61 Id. at 819. 
62 Id. 
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if the purchaser reasonably inspected the property and did not find any 
defects, the seller may be liable if the purchaser finds evidence of 
concealed defects.68  Actively concealing leaks by using reservoirs to 
catch the falling liquid is one form of active concealment.69  
Additionally, disguising mechanisms to hide their dysfunctionality 
also constitutes active concealment.70  Here, a reasonable purchaser 
and inspector would likely assume that the property is in good 
condition.  Thus, this casts responsibility on the seller for lying about 
the property conditions. 
D.  Duty to Disclose Jurisdictions 
Another approach to residential real property law is the duty to 
disclose.  Some states apply this standard instead of caveat emptor.71  
Here, a seller must disclose material defects regarding any condition 
that is not readily observable by the purchaser, plus any defective 
condition within the seller’s knowledge.72  Some duty to disclose 
jurisdictions, like Indiana, “codified a portion of the normal home-
buying back-and-forth between buyers and sellers, and in doing so 
streamlined the process with the aim of starting every such transaction 
on the same footing.”73 
Additionally, jurisdictions such as Florida opted to utilize the 
duty to disclose approach.74  In Johnson v. Davis,75 the sellers failed to 
disclose material, defective conditions.76  Under the sales contract, it 
was the purchasers’ responsibility to obtain a written report drafted by 
 
68 See infra note 69. 
69 See Margolin v. I M Kapco, Inc., 932 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011).  The 
plaintiff purchaser brought an action for fraudulent concealment.  Id.  After purchasing a home 
in Nassau County, she noticed multiple leaks from the skylights in the home, which caused 
extensive damage.  Id.  The court held that there was significant evidence that the seller 
fraudulently concealed the leaks.  Id.  The purchaser contended that the seller used “large 
commercial-size aluminum roasting pans” to disguise the presence of any leaks.  Id. at 124.  
The appellate court held that this showed evidence of active concealment.  Id.  Thus, if such 
conduct is proven, the seller would be held liable.  Id. 
70 See Delano, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
71 See infra notes 73-76. 
72 Florrie Young Roberts, Let the Seller Beware: Disclosures, Disclaimers, and “As Is” 
Clauses, 31 REAL EST. L. J. 303 (2003). 
73 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-21-5-7 (West 2019). 
74 See Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed? – Doubting the Demise of 
Caveat Emptor, 55 Md. L. Rev. 387, 400 (1996). 
 75 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). 
 76 Id. at 626. 
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a roofer indicating the watertight condition of the roof.77  Under the 
agreement, if repairs were needed, the sellers shall pay for them.78  
Upon inspection, the purchasers noticed buckling and peeling plaster 
around a window, as well as stains on the wallpaper.79  The roofers 
hired by the purchasers claimed that the roof was completely defective, 
and the only solution to create a watertight seal would be to replace the 
roof.80  Consequently, the purchasers sued claiming breach of contract, 
fraud, and misrepresentation, in addition to requesting the return of 
their deposit.81 
The Supreme Court of Florida held that Florida law has since 
shied away from the doctrine of caveat emptor and moved towards a 
fairer and more equitable standard: duty to disclose.82  The court stated 
that “[o]ne should not be able to stand behind the impervious shield of 
caveat emptor and take advantage of another’s ignorance.”83  Here, 
“where the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the 
value of the property which are not readily observable and are not 
known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the 
buyer.”84  Since sellers knew of the material defect and opted not to 
disclose, they were held liable for their actions.85  Accordingly, the 
court awarded the purchasers their deposit plus interest, costs, and 
fees.86 
The duty to disclose standard imposed throughout many states 
proves to be fairer because it takes some pressure off the purchaser to 
discover latent material defects during a home inspection.  Under the 
traditional doctrine of caveat emptor, even if there are latent material 
defects, a seller is not liable so long as he did not actively conceal or 
misrepresent the property.87  As such, the duty to disclose standard 
provides for a more equitable solution to solving real property 
disputes.  With the combination of concepts modeled on the doctrine 
 
 77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  The sellers stated that the problem was already corrected.  Id.  However, in the days 
following the confrontation, the purchasers were greeted with water gushing from the 
defective area, the ceiling, and light fixtures.  Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 628. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 629. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:29 (4th ed. 2019). 
9
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of caveat emptor and disclosure rules modeled on fairness, the duty to 
disclose standard provides a “happy-medium” for purchasers and 
sellers alike. 
E.  Analysis of Recent Caveat Emptor Cases 
An example of a typical caveat emptor case is Platzman v. 
Morris.88  In Platzman, the plaintiff purchasers entered into a contract 
for the sale of a home in Nanuet, New York.89  Upon inspecting the 
home and before entering the agreement with the defendant sellers, the 
purchasers observed that the home included three kitchens, one on 
each level of the home.90  In the sales contract, the sellers represented 
the home as a legal one-family home.91  The contract further included 
an “as-is” clause, which provided that the purchasers were aware of 
the current condition of the property and agreed to take possession of 
it in its final, “as-is” condition from the sellers.92  Moreover, the “as-
is” clause stated that the purchasers would not rely on any other 
representations or information given by the sellers.93  After discovering 
the illegality of the second-floor kitchen, the purchasers claimed 
fraud.94 
The court held that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied.95  
The purchasers had the duty to inspect the property at their leisure.96  
A proper inspection would have included an inquiry into the legality 
of each of the three kitchens.97  Since the purchasers did not make any 
attempt to investigate, they did not fulfill their duty under caveat 
emptor.98  Additionally, the purchasers signed the contract with the 
“as-is” clause, which provided that the purchasers were fully aware of 
the condition of the property before purchase.99 
 
88 742 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
89 Id. at 503. 
90 Id.  The sellers stated that the basement kitchen was illegal, while the kitchens on the first 
and second floors were legal. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  The purchasers were responsible for taking the property subject to their inspection. 
94 Id.at 503-04. 




99 Id.  The presence of such a clause further emphasized the purchasers’ need to fully inspect 
the premises.   
10
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While professional inspection is essential for claimants suing 
for fraud or misrepresentation, the presence of factual statements is 
equally important.100  In Glazer v. LoPreste,101 the plaintiff purchasers 
entered into a contract for the sale of a home in Nassau County.102  
Prior to entering the agreement, the purchasers inquired about the 
desirability of the area and how it correlated to raising children.103  The 
defendant sellers stated that the neighborhood was “a good place to 
raise children.”104  According to the purchasers’ complaint, a convicted 
sex offender lived across the street from the property.105  The 
purchasers sought damages on the basis that the sellers fraudulently 
misrepresented the characteristics of the neighborhood.106 
The court held that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied 
because there was no indication of misrepresentation on the part of the 
sellers.107  There are only two ways of recovering under the doctrine 
of caveat emptor for misrepresentation: either the presence of a 
fiduciary relationship or the presence of fraud.108  The court 
determined that this was a traditional arm’s length transaction and that 
no fiduciary relationship could be inferred.109  Furthermore, the sellers 
did not fraudulently misrepresent property information.110  The court 
found that any information provided to the purchasers regarding the 
characteristics of the neighborhood constituted mere opinions.111  A 
seller makes a misrepresentation when the statements are fact-based 
and not opinions.112 
Additionally, the court also found that the purchasers could not 
maintain a claim for fraud because they could have easily discovered 
the charges against their new neighbor by due inquiry.113  Any 
 
100 See Glazer v. LoPreste, 717 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2000). 
101 Id. 
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reasonably prudent purchaser could have become aware of these 
charges by reading articles printed in local newspapers.114   
Before the enactment of the PCDA, New York Real Property 
Law focused heavily on limiting liability for the seller.115  Purchasers 
bore the brunt of the responsibility.116  Essentially, sellers were 
shielded from liability for property defects unless there was some 
indication of misrepresentation or fiduciary relationship.  Purchasers, 
on the other hand, were responsible for knowing and understanding all 
property conditions.  It is a purchaser’s responsibility to investigate the 
property prior to entering into a contract.   
New York’s historical doctrine of caveat emptor required 
purchasers “to do their homework” before they entered a contract.117  
Purchasers always maintain the right to inspect the property before 
closing.118  Thus, the purchasers had the duty to inspect the premises 
for illegalities and other nonconformities.119  However, in Platzman, 
the purchasers relied on the sellers’ word and did not exercise due 
diligence.120  Similarly, in Glazer, the purchasers claimed reliance on 
the sellers’ opinions about the characteristics of the neighborhood and 
its compatibility with raising a child.121  The purchasers did not make 
any effort to investigate the neighborhood before contracting with the 
sellers.122  By adopting the doctrine of caveat emptor, New York 
desired to eradicate the use of non-justifiable reliance as an excuse to 
rescind a contract.123   
When negotiating, purchasers should not rely on sellers’ words.  
It is a well-known rule of contract law that the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing only applies once the parties form a contract.124  During 
the negotiation process, there is no direct duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.125  The doctrine of caveat emptor reminds purchasers that they 
 
114 Id.  As such, the court held for the sellers. 
115 See 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:26 (4th ed. 2019). 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Platzman v. Morris, 742 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Glazer v. LoPreste, 717 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2000). 
122 Id. 
123 See generally 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:26 (4th ed. 2019). 
124 U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
125 In re 50 Pine Co., LLC, 317 B.R. 276, 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)). 
12
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need to investigate for themselves, regardless of what was said or 
promised prior to contracting for the sale of the property, absent 
fraud.126   
III.  STAMBOVSKY V. ACKLEY 
The doctrine of caveat emptor involves a large amount of 
double, double toil and trouble.  For purchasers, this doctrine is 
considered one of the most feared of all.  Lurking in the shadows, the 
haunting caldron of caveat emptor bubbled over in Stambovsky v. 
Ackley.127   
The quaint village of Nyack, New York is known for its charm 
and traditional Victorian homes.128  However, the village was 
publicized for unique folklore involving poltergeists.129  Stambovsky v. 
Ackley took New York on a journey throughout the riveting world of 
paranormal activity.130   
The plaintiff purchaser, Stambovsky, sought to purchase a 
home from the defendant seller, Ackley.131  Unbeknownst to 
Stambovsky, the home was purportedly haunted.132  Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, the home caught the eyes of thousands, captivating 
residents’ eyes and drawing their attention towards this perplexing, 
paranormal phenomenon through its publication in newspapers.133  
Stambovsky willingly entered into the contract without the knowledge 
of the haunting to which he became bound.134  Once becoming 
cognizant of the situation, Stambovsky sought to rescind the 
contract.135  Not only was Stambovsky concerned about his well-being, 
 
126 While this rule is clearly advantageous for sellers, it is blatantly unfair to unsuspecting 
purchasers.  This opens up a realm of opportunity for justifiable reliance by the purchasers, 
which is seemingly pushed to the side when the doctrine of caveat emptor is involved. 
127 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1991). 
128 See generally Win Perry, History of Nyack NY, VISIT NYACK, 
http://visitnyack.org/history-of-nyack/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
129 See generally Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672. 
130 This case received special emphasis in this Note because of the unique situation of the 
parties and the applicability of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
131 Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 674. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  However, as a native New York City resident, Stambovsky did not receive local 
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but he was worried about the current property value and the future 
resale value of the home.136 
The issue was whether Stambovsky was entitled to rescind the 
purchase agreement based on fraudulent misrepresentation.137  The 
trial court dismissed the action and Stambovsky appealed.138  At the 
time, New York primarily operated under the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.139   
Here, the appellate court insinuated that the presence of 
paranormal activity was considered a material defect.140  Under the 
doctrine of caveat emptor, a purchaser must “act prudently to assess 
the fitness and value of his purchase.”141  While a purchaser is under a 
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of the premises before 
entering a contract for sale, such investigation would not have been 
reasonable.142  Justice Rubin noted that “the most meticulous 
inspection of the premises and the search would not [have revealed] 
the presence of poltergeists at the premises or [unearthed] the 
property’s ghoulish reputation in the community.”143   
The court noted that the doctrine of “caveat emptor is not so 
all-encompassing a doctrine of common law as to render every act of 
non-disclosure immune from redress whether legal or equitable.”144  
The court went on to mention the Latin phrase, ex facto jus oritur, or 
“the law arises out of facts.”145  The court reasoned that, after 
investigating the facts, if fairness and common sense would indicate 
that the court should recognize an exception to the general rule, “the 
evolution of law should not be stifled by rigid application of a legal 
maxim.”146  The court noted that the plaintiff had an equitable remedy 
despite the absence of one at law.147  The court further held that it 





139 Id. at 675.  As noted by the court, a seller does not have a duty to disclose unless there 
is a fiduciary relationship or the nondisclosure amounts to active concealment. 
140 Id. at 676. 
141 Id. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 675. 
145 Id. at 676. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.  The property was inevitably advertised to the public as a site for paranormal activity 
and Ackley may have owed Stambovsky even less of a duty to disclose. 
14
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contract for sale.148  As such, the appellate court reinstated the claim 
for rescission.149 
Enforcement of the contract would undeniably harm 
Stambovsky.  The damaging effects of purchasing a home that has the 
reputation of being haunted, unbeknownst to the purchaser, would 
greatly outweigh any positive aspects of upholding the contract.  
However, the main objective of the court is to keep contracts in place.  
In this case, it would greatly offend the very basis of the law: to be fair 
and equitable.  It is crucial to evaluate the claim for rescission based 
on both legal remedies and equitable remedies.  When legal remedies 
fail, the court should turn to equitable remedies.150  The court properly 
held that equity can support a claim for rescission.151  Since 
Stambovsky was not native to the area, it would have been nearly 
impossible for him to know about the latent, paranormal conditions of 
the property.152  Regardless of the attention the property received as a 
result of the seller’s publication of the property as a haunted house, the 
purchaser still could not have reasonably anticipated such notoriety.153  
Furthermore, becoming aware of the presence of poltergeists is not 
similar to discovering other defective conditions, such as flooding, 
termites, and mold.  A reasonably prudent purchaser can generally 
more readily observe these defects.  In some cases, even an inspector 
can have difficulty discovering these defects.  Paranormal activity is 
mysterious, latent, and undetectable by the naked eye.154  As such, the 
court utilized its discretion correctly in determining that rescission 
would be fair and equitable. 
Additionally, the court examined the effect of the “as-is” 
clause.  The court noted that “[e]ven an express disclaimer will not be 
given effect where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
party invoking it.”155  Furthermore, such a disclaimer would only 
 
148 Id. at 677.  Additionally, the court noted that the defendant was responsible for the 
house’s haunted reputation. 
149 Id. 
150 Equitable remedies may include rescission. 
151 Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 675. 
152 While the property was publicized in a national publication, approximately fifteen years 
had passed between the date of publication and the date of contract commencement.  Id. at 
674. 
153 Today, with the use of modern technology, a purchaser would easily be able to discover 
this information by initiating a Google search. 
154 See Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676. 
155 See id. at 676-77 (citing Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 322 (1959)). 
15
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preclude representations made regarding physical defects.156  Here, the 
court clarified that paranormal activity was not considered physical or 
tangible, and thus the “as-is” clause did not extend to this condition.157 
The outcome would have been the same if the litigants tried the 
case after the enactment of the PCDA.  The court analyzed and 
resolved this case as a matter of equity, not as a matter of law.  The 
PCDA limits the use of the doctrine of caveat emptor, except for the 
“opt-out” option.158  However, the PCDA does not extend its grasp 
over the law of equity.159  Therefore, if the court decides that the claim 
is equitable rather than legal, the court would shy away from the PCDA 
and use its sound discretion to determine the revocability of the 
contract or other remedies.160 
Additionally, irrespective of the law of equity, the presence of 
paranormal activity was within the seller’s actual knowledge.161  The 
seller stated that the home was haunted and obtained national 
recognition for such conditions.162  While paranormal activity is 
considered material and latent, the seller acted upon the information as 
if it was patent.163  The seller wrongfully withheld such material 
information from the purchaser, and thus the purchaser agreed to the 
purchase without proper warning of the property conditions.164  Under 
the PCDA, the seller should have disclosed property information to the 
buyer.165  However, if the seller opted to provide the purchaser with 
the five-hundred-dollar credit, then the seller would only be liable if 
the purchaser could prove a misrepresentation on the seller’s part.166    
 
156 Id. at 260. 
157 Id. 
158 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 465 (McKinney 2019). 
159 See generally id. § 462. 
160 See generally id. 
161 See Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 675. 
162 Id. at 674. 
163 Id. at 674-75. 
164 Id. 
165 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462 (McKinney 2019). 
166 See id. § 465. 
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IV.  THE PROPERTY CONDITION DISCLOSURE ACT 
The doctrine of caveat emptor imposes a strict burden on the 
purchasers.167  In response, on March 1, 2002, the New York 
legislature enacted the Property Condition Disclosure Act (the 
“PCDA”).168  The legislature designed this statute to help buyers 
recover damages from undisclosed, defective conditions affecting 
residential real property.169  The PCDA states that “every seller of 
residential real property pursuant to a real estate purchase contract 
shall complete and sign a property condition disclosure statement.”170  
The seller shall deliver the disclosure statement to the buyer before the 
buyer signs the sales contract.171  However, the PCDA does not 
prohibit parties from entering into “as-is” sales agreements.172   
Section 462(2) of the PCDA outlines the format of the 
PCDS.173  The PCDS is not a warranty by the seller, nor is it a 
substitute for property inspections.174  Instead, the completed PCDS is 
a representation based on the seller’s actual knowledge at the time of 
completion.175  A seller will be held liable for actual damages suffered 
by a purchaser, and other existing equitable or statutory remedies if the 
seller’s conduct amounts to a willful failure to perform the 
requirements under the PCDA.176 
A. Legislative Intent of the Property Condition 
Disclosure Act 
The PCDA intended to allow purchasers and sellers to obtain 
more information regarding the purchase and sale of residential real 
property and to increase the transparency with purchasers.177  
 
167 See Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001); Perin v. Mardine 
Realty Co., 168 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1957). 
168 REAL PROP. § 462(1). 




173 Id. § 462(2). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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However, the PCDA falls short of significantly benefitting 
purchasers.178 
The addition of the “opt-out” option shifts the law from pro-
purchaser back to pro-seller.  Essentially, this option allows sellers to 
buy-out of their statutory obligation.179  In essence, the “opt-out” 
option acts as a security blanket for sellers.  Sellers can provide a mere 
five hundred dollars at closing, which is meaningless when compared 
to the price of a home in New York.180  The “opt-out” option is 
comparable to a “get out of jail free” card in Monopoly.  It is a seller’s 
way of avoiding punishment.   
The initial intention of the PCDA was to “regularize disclosure 
and supplement information provided by professional inspections and 
tests, and searches of public records.”181  The PCDS was to be 
completed, signed, and delivered to the purchaser before entering into 
a contract for sale.182  The statute sought to change the way New York 
adapted the use of the doctrine of caveat emptor by slightly limiting its 
scope.183  The seller would only provide a written statement concerning 
the property according to the purchaser’s actual knowledge at the time 
of completion.184  Furthermore, the PCDA was neither a limitation on 
a purchaser’s responsibility to conduct investigations and inspections 
nor a limitation on remedies.185   
The court in Gabberty v. Pisarz186 explained that if the 
legislature were to draft the PCDA any differently, it would 
significantly override the doctrine of caveat emptor.187  The court also 
stated that “[m]aking it any easier on the buyer would cut a swath 




180 See infra Section VIII. 
181 Gabberty v. Pisarz, 810 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2005).  Plaintiff 
purchaser and defendant seller entered into a contract for the sale of residential real property.  
Id. at 800.  The purchaser commenced an action against the seller for failure to disclose a 
material defect affecting the property (i.e. flooding).  Id.  While the seller provided the 
purchaser with a PCDS, it was incomplete, thus warranting the awarding of the five-hundred-
dollar credit to the purchaser as damages.  Id. at 802.  This was the sole remedy for the 






186 810 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2005).   
187 Id. at 804-05.  
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the statements of legislative intent.”188  The statute still imposed a 
burden on the purchaser to obtain professional inspections of the 
property.189  Eliminating this burden would persuade the seller not to 
complete the form and opt to provide the credit.190  Additionally, 
eliminating the burden would be contrary to the enactment of the 
PCDA.191  Furthermore, the court is not in a position to change the 
common law that puts a significant burden on the purchaser to exercise 
his or her due diligence before the purchase of the property.192 
Based on the analysis of the legislative intent, it is imperative 
to understand both the purchaser’s and seller’s obligations under the 
PCDA.  The purchaser must obtain a professional inspection of the 
property before closing.193  Additionally, it is the purchaser’s 
responsibility for understanding all patent property conditions.194  
However, the seller must make the disclosure of all property conditions 
on the PCDS, as well as provide truthful information within the seller’s 
actual knowledge regarding any defective conditions.195 
While it seems clear that the purpose of the act was to give 
more flexibility to purchasers, the PCDA imposes the burden of 
discovery of defective property conditions on the purchaser with the 
addition of the opt-out option.196  This feature of the legislation 
encourages sellers to provide purchasers with the five-hundred-dollar 
credit in lieu of the PCDS.197  The consensus among real estate 
attorneys is to advise their clients to provide the credit, rather than the 
statement.198  Purchasers must use the utmost care in evaluating their 
prospective purchases before entering a sales contract.  Not 
coincidentally, this was the original intent of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.  The PCDA showed to lessen that burden on the purchasers.199  
However, the “opt-out” option revived New York’s common law 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 805. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 807. 
193 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462 (McKinney 2019). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. § 465(1). 
197 Id. 
198 Philip Lucrezia, New York’s Property Condition Disclosure Act: Extensive Loopholes 
Leave Buyers and Sellers of Residential Real Property Governed by the Common Law, 77 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 411 (2003). 
199 See REAL PROP. § 462. 
19
Albano: Caveat Emptor
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
386 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
roots.  In effect, the “opt-out” option belittles the first portion of the 
PCDA. 
B.  Purchaser’s Win: Material Misrepresentation 
The enactment of the PCDA significantly helped purchasers 
recover damages for undisclosed defects.  In Kier v. Wilcox,200 the 
plaintiff purchasers commenced an action against the defendant sellers 
for the alleged non-disclosure of the location of the home’s septic 
system.201  The sellers opted to complete the PCDS and claimed that, 
at the time they finalized the PCDS, they were not aware that the septic 
system was located on adjacent property.202  However, the court found 
that two weeks before closing, a real estate agent notified the sellers of 
the location of the septic system.203  Generally, once the sellers become 
aware of a material defect that they did not previously disclose on the 
PCDS, the sellers then must revise the PCDS.204  In this case, the sellers 
failed to revise the PCDS.205  The failure to disclose the known issue 
amounted to a material misrepresentation, and thus the court found for 
the purchasers. 
Blatantly lying on the PCDS is a misrepresentation.  In 
Sicignano v. Dixey,206 the plaintiff purchaser entered into a residential 
real estate contract with the defendant seller in June 2009.207  Upon 
completing the PCDS, the defendant answered in the negative when 
approached with questions regarding flooding.208  The defendant 
contended that there were no prior issues of flooding, grading issues, 
or standing water in the basement of the home.209  However, after 
closing, the purchaser experienced severe flooding and standing water 
in the home and commenced an action for fraud and breach of 
contract.210   
 
200 993 N.Y.S.2d 644 (City of Canandaigua Ct. 2014). 
201 Id. at 644.  The purchasers contended that the sellers were aware that the septic system 





206 2 N.Y.S.3d 301 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2015). 
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During discovery, the plaintiff submitted interrogatories and 
deposition testimony from the defendant in which he admitted that the 
home experienced prior instances of flooding.211  Additionally, the 
plaintiff submitted affidavits from thirteen surrounding neighbors who 
testified that the property was prone to chronic flooding.212  The 
affidavits showed that the flooding was so severe that the water 
pumped from the basement of the home flooded the adjacent streets.213  
While the defendant claimed that the neighbors mistakenly confused 
the defendant’s home with another neighbor’s home, the court held 
that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
seller had actual knowledge of past flooding.214  On appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed the lower court, and thus denied the seller’s 
motion for summary judgment.215 
The PCDA moved New York away from the traditional 
doctrine of caveat emptor.  The PCDA puts more responsibility on the 
sellers to disclose defects regarding the property they intend to sell.  
There is a heightened awareness for sellers to be truthful when 
completing the PCDS.  In light of fraudulent non-disclosure, the sellers 
may be held liable for actual damages and any other remedies the court 
finds appropriate.216  Furthermore, a seller who executes a PCDS and 
discovers a defect affecting the property before closing must provide 
the purchaser with a revised PCDS reflecting the newly discovered 
defect to avoid liability.217  Under caveat emptor, mere silence, without 
an affirmative action to deceive, does not amount to active 
concealment by the seller.218   
 
211 Id. at 303. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 303-04.  For a seller to be liable, the seller must knowingly misrepresent a material 
fact regarding the property in the disclosure statement and the purchaser must have relied on 
the seller’s representation.  Id.  Furthermore, a false representation, such as the failure to 
correct a known misrepresentation in a PCDS, may constitute active concealment, which is 
actionable under the PCDA.  Id. 
215 Id.  Since there existed a genuine issue of material fact, a necessary element for summary 
judgment, the court refused to grant the motion.  Id. at 303.  At that point, it was not clear 
whether the seller was aware of the flooding issues prior to drafting the PCDS.  If he had actual 
knowledge of the flooding issues, then he should have provided the purchaser with a revised 
PCDS.  Additionally, having actual knowledge of the flooding issues and reporting otherwise 
would constitute a material misrepresentation, as the seller would be engaging in dishonesty. 
216 See supra note 206. 
217 See supra note 200. 
218 Perez-Faringer v. Heilman, 944 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
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C. Seller’s Win: No Actual Knowledge 
While the PCDA helps unsuspecting purchasers recover 
damages for undisclosed defects, the PCDA also helps sellers.  In 
Klafehn v. Morrison,219 the defendant sellers decided to list their four-
unit apartment building for sale.220  The sellers provided the purchaser 
with a PCDS, which stated that the building was prone to seasonal 
dampness in the basement.221  With notice of this issue, the purchaser 
contacted a professional inspector before closing.222  The inspector 
noted issues in the bathroom where the flooring was “soft when walked 
on.”223  Based on his conclusions, the inspector recommended that the 
purchaser have the flooring repaired.224  The purchaser failed to act 
upon the advice prior to closing.225   
Approximately one year later, the purchaser experienced these 
issues and commenced an action against the sellers for fraudulent non-
disclosure.226  The court held that the sellers could not have had actual 
knowledge of the current issues because they reasonably believed that 
the issues were corrected nine years earlier.227  Furthermore, the sellers 
indicated that the building was subject to “seasonal dampness.”228  
Here, the court held that there was no evidence of concealment by the 
sellers.229  Moreover, the purchaser could not have relied on the sellers’ 
statements on the PCDS because of his own inspector’s report.230 
Despite obtaining a PCDS, a purchaser should have a 
heightened awareness to confirm the validity of the statements by 
exercising due diligence.  A seller’s unwillingness to provide the 
disclosure should draw a red flag for the purchaser, as a buyer can 
reasonably understand that the seller is attempting to release himself 
from responsibility for any potentially defective conditions.  
 
219 906 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012). 
220 Id. at 348.  The building had been subject to frequent wastewater discharge, which was 
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Regardless, the purchaser should always obtain a proper inspection of 
the property as part of his due diligence. 
If a purchaser had relevant knowledge regarding any possibility 
of a defect, the seller might prevail.  In Meyers v. Rosen,231 the 
purchasers sued the sellers for fraudulent non-disclosure.232  Before 
contracting, the purchasers received a PCDS which indicated that the 
septic system on the property was approximately sixteen years old.233  
However, the seller did not indicate whether the septic system was 
defective.234 
The purchasers visited the property numerous times and had 
the property professionally inspected before closing.235  The seller 
fixed any issues that arose during the inspection to the satisfaction of 
the purchasers.236  Upon taking possession of the property, the 
purchasers noticed that the septic system had failed.237  The purchasers 
then commenced the action and claimed that the sellers failed to 
disclose these defects on the PCDS.238  The court held that the seller’s 
silence about the defects did not provide a basis for a remedy.239  In 
addition to understanding that the septic system was sixteen years old, 
the purchasers were also aware of the fact that a sump pump would 
frequently run during rainstorms.240  Here, the court determined that 
such information warranted heightened alertness for the purchasers to 
beware.241  The purchasers decided to close on the home, even with the 
knowledge of such information.242  Thus, the purchasers could not 
obtain relief from the sellers.243   
 
231 893 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
232 Id. at 356. 
233 Id. 
234 Id.  Additionally, the contract contained an as-is clause. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id.  This is directly contrary to what the seller described on the PCDS. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 357.  Failure to revise a PCDS when actual knowledge of a defect comes to fruition 
would result in the liability for the seller.  However, in this case, there was no indication that 
the seller had actual knowledge of the failed septic system.  Also, the inclusion of the as-is 
clause and the disclosure of the aging septic system imposed a greater duty to inspect on the 
purchasers.   
240 Id. at 357-58. 
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D. Seller’s Win: Exercise of Ordinary Intelligence 
The PCDA provides more protection to unsuspecting 
purchasers.  However, this legislation does not shelter a purchaser from 
responsibility.  In some instances, the purchaser still bears the risk.  In 
Behar v. Glickenhaus Westchester Development, Inc.,244 the 
purchasers contracted to purchase a home located adjacent to an active 
golf course.245  Upon closing, a large oak tree acted as a barrier 
between the golf course and the home.246  However, a storm caused the 
tree to fall sometime after, leaving an open entryway for “out of 
bounds” golf balls to strike the property.247  The purchasers sued the 
sellers for fraudulent concealment of the significant risks that arose 
from the adjacent golf course.248 
The court in Behar did not apply the traditional doctrinal 
provisions of the PCDA.249  Instead, the court determined this outcome 
based on common sense.  The court held that the seller did not have 
any duty to disclose the purported defective condition because the risks 
were easily ascertainable by the exercise of ordinary intelligence since 
the risks concerned a matter of public record.250  Purchasing a home 
adjacent to a golf course increases the risk for errant golf balls to 
intrude on one’s property.  The risk is so obvious that any reasonable 
purchaser should have known that this risk existed or should have 
researched it further.251   
 
244 996 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 




249 Id.  The court did not specify whether the seller completed the disclosure statement but 
the court’s application of the doctrine of caveat emptor implies opting out of completion. 
250 Id. at 680.  The court did not mention the application of the rules behind the PCDA.  
Instead, it focused mainly on how the purchasers could have easily apprised themselves of 
such information by exercising common sense.   
251 Id. See Esposito v. Saxon Home Realty, Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 152 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
1998).  That case held that the boundaries of the subject property were not within the seller’s 
knowledge and were readily ascertainable by searching public records.  Id. at 152.  The court 
dismissed the complaint based on the purchaser’s failure to exercise ordinary intelligence.  Id. 
See also Belizaire v. Keller Williams Landmark II, 111 N.Y.S.3d 800 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 
2018).  That case involved a purported misrepresentation of tax information on a home in 
Valley Stream, New York.  Id. at 800.  The purchasers claimed that the misrepresentation of 
the taxes attracted them to the home.  Id.  However, the court held that the tax information was 
a matter of public record and that any such reliance was not justifiable, as any reasonably 
prudent purchaser could have easily found such information.  Id. 
24
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E. Summation: Impact and Scope of the Property 
Condition Disclosure Act 
Completing a PCDS will not relieve the purchaser of all 
responsibility concerning defective property conditions.  As noted in 
Klafehn, a purchaser loses his or her ability to rely on the PCDS if the 
seller becomes apprised of new information contrary to his original 
disclosure on the PCDS.252  Furthermore, a seller, who genuinely does 
not have actual knowledge of the defect at the time of the completion 
of the PCDS and does not obtain any contrary information, cannot be 
held liable for the discovery of unknown defects post-closing.253  
Finally, if the defective conditions are reasonably ascertainable by the 
exercise of ordinary intelligence, the purchasers are responsible.254 
The PCDA is not an ultimate shield for purchasers.  There exist 
multiple caveats which allow a seller to still prevail on claims for non-
disclosure or concealment.255  Generally, a common caveat is whether 
the defects were within the seller’s actual knowledge.  If there is any 
indication that the seller and the purchaser discovered the defect 
simultaneously, the seller cannot be held liable.256  Additionally, while 
it seems rather difficult to prove whether the condition was within the 
seller’s actual knowledge, outside testimony can prove helpful to the 
purchasers.257 
V. THE “OPT-OUT” OPTION 
To avoid potential disputes, the New York legislature built a 
unique caveat into the PCDA: the “opt-out” option.258  Similar to other 
state laws,259 Section 465(1) of the PCDA contains a provision which 
states that if a seller chooses not to provide the purchaser with a PCDS 
 
252 Klafehn v. Morrison, 906 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012). 
253 Meyers v. Rosen, 893 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
254 Behar, 996 N.Y.S.2d at 680. 
255 See supra Section IV(B). 
256 See supra note 219. 
257 See supra note 206. 
258 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 465(1) (McKinney 2019). 
259 See 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179) (West); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:45A-29.1 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-35 (West 2019). 
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prior to contracting, the seller shall provide the purchaser with a five-
hundred-dollar credit at closing.260   
The leniency of the “opt-out” option shifts the responsibility 
for property defects back to the purchaser.261  Sellers can restore the 
traditional doctrine of caveat emptor if they provide the purchasers 
with a five-hundred-dollar credit at closing.262  In turn, most 
practitioners in the real estate law industry typically recommend that 
sellers provide this credit so that they will not be responsible for 
defective conditions affecting the property.263  Furthermore, the credit 
acts as “‘cheap insurance’ to protect sellers against an inadvertent 
‘incomplete statement.’”264   
The court in Meyers v. Rosen265 outlined a vital rule for 
purchasers when accepting the five-hundred-dollar credit.266  If the 
parties use the “opt-out” option, then the purchasers need to beware of 
defects and to conduct thorough inspections before closing.267  
Additionally, the court noted that, by a seller not furnishing a purchaser 
with a PCDS, such conduct should put the purchaser on notice of 
potential defects.268   
In Daly v. Kochanowicz,269 the purchaser commenced an action 
against the sellers for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.270  Before 
entering into the purchase agreement, the purchaser had the property 
 
260 Id. 
261 See generally REAL PROP. § 465(1). 
262 See generally id. 
263 See Emily Pickrell, Should You Sign a Property Condition Disclosure?, NEWSDAY (Sept. 
5, 2007), https://www.newsday.com/business/should-you-sign-a-property-condition-
disclosure-1.876762. 
264 Blumenthal, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of NY, 2018 Electronic 
Update, Real Property Law § 465. 
265 893 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
266 See id. at 357. 
267 Id. 
268 Id.; see Bishop v. Graziano, 804 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2005).  Similarly, 
in Bishop, the purchasers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud.  Id. at 237.  Upon 
taking occupancy of the home, the purchasers noticed damage to the floors and walls.  Id. at 
238.  However, based on the contract and addendum to the contract, the sellers elected not to 
furnish purchasers with a PCDS, but to exercise their opt-out rights.  Id. at 237-38.  The credit, 
therefore, precluded the purchasers’ claims because it was their responsibility to inspect the 
home for defects prior to closing.  Id. at 238.  Additionally, any purported reliance (unless 
there is a misrepresentation) would not be actionable under New York law due to the credit.  
Id. at 239-40. 
269 884 N.Y.S.2d 144 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009). 
270 Id. at 147. 
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inspected by a professional.271  The inspector noted minimal evidence 
of water intrusion in the basement of the home, which the sellers 
denied.272  Also, the inspector informed the purchaser that the 
Mamaroneck River sat within the confines of the property.273  The 
purchaser disregarded such information and decided to close on the 
home.274   
Within a few months, the home flooded.275  The sellers 
provided the purchaser with the five-hundred-dollar credit at closing, 
which exempted the sellers from completing the PCDS.276  The court 
held that the furnishing of the five-hundred-dollar credit and the 
sellers’ refusal to sign the addendum constituted a “fair warning” to 
the purchaser.277  Moreover, the survey of the property which depicted 
the property sitting on the Mamaroneck River should have alerted the 
purchaser to potential problems.278  Lastly, the defective condition was 
not within the sellers’ actual knowledge.279  Such conduct amounted to 
a failure to exercise due diligence on the part of the purchaser, and thus 
the court dismissed her claims.280   
The “opt-out” option opens purchasers up to significant risk, 
much like the doctrine of caveat emptor.  The “opt-out” option takes 
the risk, which the legislature previously assigned to the sellers under 
the PCDA, and reassigns it back to the purchasers.281  Thus, a seller 
can once again invoke the doctrine of caveat emptor.  The “red flag” 
starts to wave as soon as the seller declines to produce the PCDS and 
opts to provide the purchaser with the five-hundred-dollar credit.  The 
“opt-out” option further emphasizes the need for the purchaser to 
beware of all conditions regarding the subject property.  If the 
purchaser receives the credit and notices defects after closing, courts 
are extremely reluctant to favor the purchaser because it is the 
 
271 Id. at 146-47. 
272 Id. at 151. 
273 Id. at 147. 
274 Id. at 82. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 150-51.  The purchaser intended to have the seller sign a rider to the contract, 
representing that there were no signs of flooding or damage.  However, the sellers declined 
and did not sign the addendum. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 155. 
280 Id. 
281 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 465 (McKinney 2019). 
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purchaser’s responsibility to conduct a proper and thorough 
investigation of the property.282 
VI. THE “AS-IS” CLAUSE 
A clause that is commonly found in many residential real 
property sale contracts is an “as-is” clause.  An “as-is” clause is a 
disclaimer of warranties or representations concerning real property.283  
Under an “as-is” clause, a seller conveys the property to the buyer in 
the exact condition as of the date of contract.284  An “as-is” clause is 
typically paired with a merger clause in a sales contract, which states 
that all prior express or implied representations are extinguished unless 
included in the sales contract.285  The PCDA explicitly states that the 
provisions of the legislation are not to prevent the governance of “as-
is” clauses.286  “As-is” clauses should be applied similarly in both 
caveat emptor jurisdictions and duty to disclose jurisdictions.287 
A. “As-Is” Preempts Silence 
An “as-is” clause may preempt liability for mere silence.  As 
previously mentioned in Section II(a), the court in Mancuso v. Rubin 
noted that the contract for sale contained an “as-is” clause, in addition 
to a pre-purchase inspection agreement.288  The court deemed the 
buyers bought the house in “as-is” condition on the date of the 
contract.289  Additionally, the merger clause in the contract warranted 
that the purchaser did not rely on any prior representations regarding 
the property unless expressly stated in the contract.290 
Here, the court stated that the purchaser made conclusory 
allegations, not factual observations of active concealment.291  Both 
 
282 See Daly, 884 N.Y.S.2d 144 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009); Meyers v. Rosen, 893 N.Y.S.2d 
354 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
283 See Simone, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 400. 
284 See id. 
285 See id. 
286 REAL PROP. § 462(1). 
287 See generally Dalmazio v. Rosa, 2014 WL 7894504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015); 
Mancuso v. Rubin, 861 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008); Berger-Vespa v. Rondack 
Building Inspectors, Inc., 740 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002). 
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the conclusory allegations and the “as-is” clause worked together for 
the court to determine the outcome in favor of the seller.292  When 
purchasing residential real property with an “as-is” clause written into 
the contract, the purchaser must exercise due diligence to determine 
any defective conditions.293  The “as-is” clause acts as another liability 
shield for the sellers.  If the purchaser is not careful, the “as-is” clause 
will control. 
B. Fraud or Concealment Preempts “As-Is” 
The “as-is” clause is a powerful tool in the seller’s arsenal.  
However, the “as-is” clause is not absolute.  Fraud or active 
concealment can preempt the “as-is” clause.294  In Berger-Vespa v. 
Rondack Building Inspectors, Inc.,295 the purchasers entered into a 
contract with the sellers to purchase a home.296  The contract included 
an “as-is” clause.297  Additionally, the agreement was contingent upon 
a professional inspection of the property.298 
The inspection company stated that there were no visible 
defects, though there was the possibility of latent defects affecting the 
property.299  Acting upon this information, the purchasers still signed 
the contract.300  However, after closing, the purchasers experienced 
flooding and sued the sellers and the inspection company for fraud and 
active concealment.301   
The court held that to preempt the “as-is” clause, the buyer 
needed to provide evidence of concealment or fraud.302  Affidavits 
from the sellers’ granddaughter, confirming that she did not experience 
any dampness or flooding in the basement, mimicked the findings in 
the inspector’s report.303  The purchasers’ observations of dampness in 
the basement, which were contrary to both the report and the affidavits, 
 
292 Id. 
293 See id. 
294 See Berger-Vespa v. Rondack Building Inspectors, Inc., 740 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 
3d Dep’t 2002). 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 505. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 505-06. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 506. 
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undermined reliance.304  There was no evidence of active concealment, 
and thus the “as-is” clause governed.305 
The “as-is” clause is similar to the “opt-out” option.  For a 
seller to be liable in either case, the buyer needs to provide evidence of 
active concealment or fraud.306  Otherwise, the purchaser is responsible 
for defective conditions.307  In either case, the purchaser would have a 
heightened sense to be more mindful of defective property conditions.  
It is his or her responsibility to investigate before entering a contract.308  
However, it is unfair to assume that a reasonable purchaser can find 
defective conditions that the seller actively concealed.  With this, the 
purchaser is free from responsibility as it passes to the seller, absent 
fraudulent conduct. 
VII. LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES 
Many states enacted similar legislation to the PCDA.309  Most 
of the legislation proposed in other states allows purchasers to receive 
some variation of a PCDS, which is based on the seller’s actual 
knowledge.310  Some states, including Connecticut, also included a 
variation of the “opt-out” option.311  However, there are states, 
including Alabama, that are primarily governed by the doctrine of 
caveat emptor.312  This section will analyze real property legislation in 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Alabama.   
A. Connecticut 
On January 1, 1995, Connecticut adopted the Uniform Property 
Condition Disclosure – Written Residential Condition Reports.313  On 







309 See 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179) (West); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:45A-29.1 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-35 (West 2019). 
310 See id. 
311 See 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179) (West). 
312 See ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (2019). 
313 See 1995 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. No. 95-311 (S.S.B. No. 217) (West). 
314 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-327(b) (West 2018). 
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and had since added to the statute.315  Here, the legislation looks 
strikingly similar to the New York PCDA.  Prior to the sale of 
residential real property, Connecticut prompts sellers to complete a 
residential condition report, which outlines the condition of the 
property and any known defects.316  Similar to New York, the sellers 
must complete the form based on their actual knowledge.317   
Furthermore, a seller who refuses to draft a residential 
condition report must provide the purchaser with a five-hundred-dollar 
credit at closing.318  The Connecticut legislature also added a provision 
which states that a seller remains liable to the purchaser, even after the 
delivery of the credit, if the purported defect is within the seller’s actual 
knowledge or “significantly impairs (i) the value of such residential 
real estate, (ii) the health or safety of future occupants of such 
residential real estate, or (iii) the useful life of such residential real 
estate.”319  The court in Giametti v. Inspections, Inc.320 stated that an 
essential purpose of the residential condition report was “to diminish 
the risk of litigation by facilitating meaningful communications 
between a vendor and a prospective purchaser.”321  A primary 
advantage for the purchaser is that the payment of the credit does not 
cease all obligations of liability for the seller.322  The exceptions 
provide a broad range of opportunities for the responsibility to revert 
to the seller.323 
Communication is an intrinsic aspect when purchasing or 
selling property.  In Giametti, the purchaser commenced an action 
against the seller and the inspection company for fraudulent and 
negligent misrepresentation.324  The seller completed and delivered the 
residential condition report, claiming that there were no known 
infestations or water damage of any kind.325  Contrary to the seller’s 
 




319 Id.  In New York, the exception is actual knowledge, without having to meet one of the 
three criteria mentioned in the Connecticut statute. 
320 76 Conn. App. 352 (2003). 
321 Id. at 360. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
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form, the purchaser discovered a carpenter ant infestation and water 
damage after closing.326 
The court held that the seller was not liable for damages 
because the seller did not have actual knowledge of the infestation or 
the water damage.327  If the seller completed the report in good faith, 
and the seller did not have any indication of any contrary defects, the 
seller could not be held liable.328   
The court further held that the seller could not be held liable for 
negligent misrepresentation.329  First, the language of the statute does 
not protect the purchaser from negligence, only actual omissions of 
fact.330  However, the common law can provide a remedy if the 
purchaser can prove that the seller made a misrepresentation on which 
the purchaser relied to his detriment.331  Because the buyer hired a 
professional inspector, the buyer did not rely on statements the seller 
made about the property.332  As such, the seller was not liable to the 
purchaser.333   
B. New Jersey 
Similar to New York and Connecticut, New Jersey also enacted 
legislation which demands that a seller provide a purchaser with a 
PCDS before entering a contract for the sale of residential real 
property.334  The Property Condition Disclosure Form requirements 
are nearly identical to those of New York and Connecticut.335  The 
seller must address all questions based on his or her actual knowledge 
and must include any actual knowledge of material defects that the 
questionnaire did not address.336  Also, purchasers are still under the 
obligation to inspect the premises themselves, as well as have the 
 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 355-56.  The residential condition report is completed based on actual knowledge.  
Id. at 359. 
328 See id. at 360. 
329 Id. at 362. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 364. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 365.  However, if the conditions were hazardous or harmful to human health, the 
court would have found the seller to be liable, based on the statutory exception. 
334 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:45A-29.1 (2019). 
335 Id.; cf. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462-65 (McKinney 2019); 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. 
P.A. No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179) (West). 
336 Id. 
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premises inspected by a professional inspector.337  Under the New 
Jersey statute, a real estate broker must acknowledge that she received 
the questionnaire from the seller.338  Next, the broker must recognize 
that she intends to provide the buyer with the questionnaire.339  Finally, 
the broker must acknowledge that she used reasonable diligence to 
inspect the property.340  However, the form does not include an “opt-
out” option, which represents a significant difference from New York 
and Connecticut law. 
C. Ohio 
Ohio previously enacted a statute similar to New York, though 
it is much more detailed.341 The Property Disclosure Form342 requires 
the seller to disclose any material defects concerning the physical 
condition of the property.343  The seller must base the information on 
his or her actual knowledge.344  If actual knowledge is unavailable, a 
seller may make a good faith approximation of the required 
disclosure.345  Further, if a seller were to render materially inaccurate 
information on the Property Disclosure Form—even if accidental—a 
court may find that the seller violated her statutory obligations.346  A 
seller can cure inaccurate information on the form by making a written 
amendment to the form.347 
While the statute is one of the more detailed statutes regarding 
this issue, the completion of the Property Disclosure Form does not 
limit any duty to disclose known material defects.348  Additionally, the 
Property Disclosure Form does not limit any common law remedies, 
including fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and non-
disclosure.349  Furthermore, upon receipt or non-completion of the 
 




341 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 2019); cf. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462-65 
(McKinney 2019). 
342 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 2019). 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
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Property Disclosure Form, the purchaser may elect to rescind the 
contract for sale and opt to obtain his or her down payment from the 
seller.350  A purchaser may waive his or her right to rescind.351 
Kramer v. Raterman352 reflects the use of the Ohio doctrine.353  
The purchasers (collectively, “Kramer”) received a residential 
property disclosure form from the sellers (collectively “Raterman”) 
before executing the contract.354  The residential property disclosure 
form indicated that Kramer regraded the property and installed a 
retaining wall to fix drainage problems.355  Additionally, Kramer 
examined the property and had a professional engineer (Raterman’s 
brother-in-law)356 complete an inspection of the retaining wall.357  
Both inspections yielded no adverse findings regarding the wall.358  
Eventually, the retaining wall collapsed.359  The court held that the 
sellers properly disclosed the retaining wall problems on the residential 
property disclosure form under state law.360  As such, the seller was 
not liable to the purchaser.361   
 
350 Id.  In other states, such as New York and Connecticut, filling out the disclosure form is 
not mandatory.  In Ohio, if the seller elects not to fill out the disclosure form, the purchaser 
can rescind the contract, inevitably making the completion of the disclosure form mandatory 
in the seller’s eyes. 
351 Id. 
352 830 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio 2005). 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 418-19. 
355 Id. at 418. 
356 This is facially problematic because property inspectors must be neutral third parties.  
Industry & Demand, INSPECT-IT 1ST, https://www.inspectit1st.com/franchises/industry-
demand/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
357 Kramer, 830 N.E.2d at 418. 
358 Id.   
359 Id.  Ohio operated as a duty to disclose jurisdiction.  Id. at 419.  The court noted that a 
purchaser is liable for any patent defects, while the seller is liable for latent defects which 
involved material facts.  Id.  Additionally, a seller is to complete the residential property 
disclosure form according to his actual knowledge.  Id. at 420. The completion of the 
residential property disclosure form does not preclude a purchaser from obtaining reasonable 
inspections of the property.  Id.  Furthermore, to have a claim based on fraud or 
misrepresentation, the purchaser must have reasonably relied on the seller’s representations to 
allocate liability to the seller.  Id. at 419-20. 
360 Id. at 422. 
361 Id. at 423. 
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D. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma, like New York, has a variation of a PCDS, namely 
the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act (the “RPCDA”).362  
The Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute which requires the seller of 
residential real property to complete and deliver a written PCDS if the 
seller previously occupied the property.363  Similar to the PCDS in 
New York, the Oklahoma PCDS must be completed based on the 
seller’s actual knowledge.364  The PCDS must also include 
conspicuous notices that state the information provided is not a 
representation of the seller to the real estate licensee, the information 
is not intended to become part of any contract between the purchaser 
and the seller, and the information contained in the PCDS does not 
represent a warranty.365  Additionally, the PCDS does not preclude any 
inspections from being performed under the direction of the 
purchaser.366  Conversely, if the seller did not occupy the premise and 
has no actual knowledge of defects, the seller must furnish the buyer 
with a written property disclaimer statement.367 
A seller can limit his or her liability to a purchaser if the seller 
notifies the buyer of all materially defective conditions before entering 
the contract.368  Generally, in Oklahoma, a seller is not liable for errors 
made on the PCDS.369  However, if the seller made an unreasonable 
approximation on the PCDS or the seller knew contrary information, 
then the seller may have circumvented the PCDS, and a court could 
find the seller liable.370   
The main difference between the New York PCDA and the 
Oklahoma RPCDA is the Oklahoma Property Disclaimer Statement.371  
New York does not have this provision, as the PCDA does not apply 
to newly constructed homes.372  In Oklahoma, the legislature decided 
to force sellers to maintain responsibility for representing to potential 
 
362 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 831. 





368 Id. § 835. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. 
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purchasers that they never occupied the property, nor make any 
disclosures concerning its condition.373  New York has separate 
legislation imposing a housing merchant implied warranty for 
developers of new constructions, even if they did not complete the 
disclaimer statement.374  While Oklahoma’s statute375 is unique, it is 
unnecessary to repeat the housing warranty portion since such a statute 
is prevalent throughout all United States jurisdictions. 
E. Alabama 
Alabama is one of a handful of states across the nation that has 
not yet enacted legislation targeted to deemphasize the doctrine of 
caveat emptor completely.376  Instead, the Alabama Legislature opted 
to utilize the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor to govern most 
residential real property disputes, exclusive of new construction.377  
However, Alabama recognizes three statutory exceptions to the 
general rule.378  First, if there exists a fiduciary relationship between 
the purchaser and the seller, the seller is obliged to disclose relevant 
material defects.379  Second, the seller must disclose all known material 
defects if the purchaser specifically inquired about the defect.380  
Lastly, if the seller is aware that such material defect substantially 
impairs health or safety, he or she must disclose the defect.381  Each of 
the three exceptions leaves a few holes in the traditional doctrine of 
caveat emptor.  As such, Alabama law mirrors a variation on the duty 
to disclose approach.382  In Alabama, if the seller knows that the defect 
will substantially impair an unsuspecting purchaser, then the seller 
must disclose.383   
 
373 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 833.  This part of the statute does not create increased 
liability in Oklahoma as compared to other states which generally have separate statutes for 
new construction. 
374 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 777(a) (McKinney 2019). 
375 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-35 (West 2019). 
376 ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (2019). 
377 Id. 
378 Elizabeth Murphy, The Current State of Caveat Emptor in Alabama Real Estate 
Transactions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 499, 508 (2009). 
379 ALA. CODE § 6-5-102; Moore v. Prudential Residential Services Ltd. Partnership, 849 
So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002). 
380 Moore, 849 So. 2d at 923. 
381 Id. 
382 See supra Section II(D). 
383 Id. 
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An application of the law can be found in Moore v. Prudential 
Residential Services Ltd. Partnership.384  In Moore, the plaintiff 
purchasers inquired about significant water damage and flooding 
before contracting.385  The sellers denied any knowledge of the sort.386  
The sellers also suggested that obtaining an inspection of the home was 
not necessary, as the home was previously inspected twice.387  The 
purchasers decided to close without a third inspection.388 
The contract contained an “as-is” clause.389  Generally, a 
purchaser cannot rely on prior representations when the buyer included 
an “as-is” clause in the contract.390  However, during litigation, the 
purchasers argued that the second exception to the general rule of 
caveat emptor (specific inquiry) applied.391  While the court 
acknowledged the purchasers’ inquiry regarding water damage, the 
court recognized that the sellers had no actual knowledge of the 
defect.392  As such, none of the exceptions applied, and the doctrine of 
caveat emptor prevailed.393   
F. Summary of the Jurisdictions 
New York’s PCDA is not unique.  Other jurisdictions, 
including Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oklahoma, have similar 
legislation.394  Under each of the laws, the seller is generally not liable 
to the purchaser, unless he or she falsely completed the disclosure 
statement as to misrepresent the property.  However, Oklahoma has an 
additional caveat to its statute.395  Oklahoma law builds in a disclaimer 
statement, which is necessary from developers who have not 
previously occupied the home.396   
 
384 849 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2002). 
385 Id. at 917. 
386 Id. 
387 Id. at 920. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 918-19. 
391 Id. at 923.  They did not claim any other exception. 
392 Id. at 926. 
393 Id. 
394 See 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179) (West); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:45A-29.1 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-35 (West 2019). 




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
404 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
On the other hand, some laws focus on an approach that 
illustrates a duty to disclose variation.397  Each state imposes different 
variations of real property laws, and thus there is no uniformity 
throughout the United States.398   
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The New York legislature passed the PCDA to help shield 
purchasers from the harmful effects of undisclosed defects.399  New 
York desired to move away from the traditional doctrine of caveat 
emptor and implement a new purchaser-favored body of law.400  The 
initial portion of the PCDA, the physical disclosure form, does just 
that.401  It shifts the burden from the purchaser to the seller and nearly 
eliminates the concept of buyer beware.402  The PCDA forces sellers 
to remain responsible for undisclosed or misrepresented property 
defects.403  However, the PCDS opens up too many avenues for 
litigation.  The courts must determine whether the defect was within 
the seller’s actual knowledge and if the seller misrepresented the 
property.404  A seller risks litigation by completing the PCDS. 
Nevertheless, a seller’s completion of the PCDS is rare.405  The 
“opt-out” option of the PCDA is more favorable to sellers because it 
forces the purchaser to be cognizant of all property conditions before 
purchasing the premises.406  The PCDA, with the utilization of the 
“opt-out” option, takes New York back to the very essence of the 
doctrine of caveat emptor.   
The plain meaning of the doctrine of caveat emptor suggests 
that the doctrine is extremely seller-centric.  This concept of “buyer 
beware” provides for a heightened sense of purchaser awareness.  
 
397 See supra Section II(D). 
398 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462 (McKinney 2019); 2019 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 
No. 19-192 (H.B. No. 7179); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §13:45A-29.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5302.30; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-35. 
399 See REAL PROP. § 462. 





405 See supra note 198. 
406 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 465(1) (McKinney 2019). 
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Additionally, this doctrine forces the purchaser to bear much of the risk 
and emphasizes the purchaser’s need to exercise proper due diligence.   
Similarly, the “opt-out” option of the PCDA provides 
overwhelming advantages for sellers.  The “opt-out” option allows the 
seller to buy his way out of the PCDA.  The penalty for failing to 
provide, or purposefully opting not to provide, the purchaser with a 
completed PCDS is only five hundred dollars.407  This penalty acts as 
a slap on the wrist.  This remedy is not sufficient.  A real estate study 
estimated that approximately eight out of ten sellers provide their 
purchasers with the five-hundred-dollar credit.408  Due to extreme 
property diversity, New York home prices vary wildly.  Thus, the “opt-
out” option credit is too low.   
If New York were to be broken up into four subsections, New 
York City, the suburban MTA counties (Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, 
Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester), and Greater Upstate 
New York, it might be easier to see how ineffective and 
disadvantageous the “opt-out” option is for purchasers.  Based on a 
2018 New York State study of median home prices for residential 
property, the average home value for areas in Greater New York 
(which consists of all counties, exclusive of the suburban MTA 
counties and New York City) was approximately $150,703.98.409  
According to the same study, the average home value for residential 
properties in the MTA counties, consisting of Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, 
Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties, was 
approximately $418,571.43.410  More recently, a 2019 study found that 
the average home price in New York City was approximately 
$670,500.00.411   
Based on each of these studies, the five-hundred-dollar credit 
is considered sham.  It is an inexpensive way for sellers to escape 
liability worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.  New York should 
modify its version of caveat emptor to fit the vast diversity of home 
values.  New York should consider legislation that uses the doctrine of 
caveat emptor with a modified credit option.  This variation would 
 
407 Id. 
408 Pickrell, supra note 263. 
409 Residential Median Sale Price Information by County, N.Y. STATE DEP’T TAX’N & FIN., 
https://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/sales/resmedian.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 
2020). 
410 Id. 
411 Oshrat Carmiel, NYC Homebuyers Find Biggest Price Reductions in Manhattan, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/property-prices/nyc/. 
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balance the purchaser’s duty to exercise due diligence against the 
seller’s responsibility to disclose. 
If New York chose to impose the doctrine of caveat emptor 
with the credit, it would be in New York’s best interest to increase the 
“opt-out” option credit to something of substantial worth.  Some 
individual purchasers rely on the credit to cover costs of inspection, 
and thus it should be increased.  Increasing the “opt-out” option credit 
to one-half percent of the property value would reflect the significant 
variation of home values across the state.  With this, there would be no 
definitive credit price for all properties. 
The current five-hundred-dollar credit for property valued at 
this price is merely ineffective.  Some homes are valued at upwards of 
two million dollars.  The approximate percentage value of the five-
hundred-dollar credit for a home priced at two million dollars is 
0.025%.  When put into this perspective, on its face, the credit 
resembles a sham.   
On the other hand, for property valued at seventy-five thousand 
dollars, the five-hundred-dollar credit may be more than necessary.  
Under this author’s recommendation of applying the credit at one-half 
percent, the total credit for a residential property valued at seventy-five 
thousand dollars would equate to three hundred seventy-five dollars.  
Under the current legislation, the purchaser would have more money 
as a result of the current credit option.   
Applying a percentage option would increase fairness for both 
the purchaser and the seller.  If the credit is too little compared to the 
value of the home, then the credit is a sham.  However, if the credit is 
too much compared to the value of the home, it could unnecessarily tip 
the balance in favor of the purchaser. 
New York should adopt this recommendation to promote 
fairness while remaining objective in its enforcement of purchase and 
sale laws surrounding residential real property.  Enforcing legislation 
emerging from the doctrine of caveat emptor reflects the idea that 
purchasers are still responsible for obtaining pertinent information 
about their newly-purchased property.  However, the enforcement of 
the percentage credit shows that purchasers should not rely on any 
previous purported representations of the property.  Additionally, the 
purchasers can use the credit to finance the cost of an inspection.   
By refraining from adopting legislation similar to the duty to 
disclose jurisdictions, New York will emphasize the importance of the 
buyer conducting the proper research before contracting.  
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Incorporating this recommendation into the legislation will aid New 
York in pioneering a new form of property condition disclosure.  While 
still retaining a portion of the current legislation, the state will be able 
to revolutionize the purchasing process of residential real estate by 
refining the current credit option, making the mandatory credit a 
percentage of total purchase price rather than a blanket fee. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
New York’s PCDA was a brief attempt to minimize the effects 
of the traditional common law doctrine of caveat emptor.  While the 
thought was there, the central provision of the PCDA, the PCDS, 
proves to be increasingly ineffective.  This legislation gives sellers two 
options to choose from: one which significantly increases their liability 
or one that significantly limits their liability.  Most sellers wisely 
choose to limit their liability.  With this, the statement provision is 
substantially inadequate.   
Prior to the enactment of the PCDA, New York governed all 
residential real property disputes under the traditional doctrine of 
caveat emptor.412  All courts, most notably, the court in Stambovsky v. 
Ackley, helped determine the outcomes by applying this principle.413  
Throughout the opinion in Stambovsky, the court consistently noted 
that it was the purchaser’s responsibility to inspect all aspects of the 
property, even though the court ultimately held that the doctrine did 
not apply based on fairness.414   
However, after the enactment of the PCDA in 2002, the 
traditional common law governance was restricted.415  The PCDS 
imposed liability on sellers to truthfully complete the form according 
to their actual knowledge of defective property conditions.416  The only 
way for sellers to escape liability is if the defective condition was not 
within their actual knowledge417 or if the defective condition was 
evident with the exercise of ordinary intelligence.418   
 
412 Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001). 
413 See generally Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1991). 
414 Id. 
415 See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 462 (McKinney 2019). 
416 Id. 
417 Meyers v. Rosen, 893 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010). 
418 Behar v. Glickenhaus Westchester Development, Inc., 996 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2014); see Esposito v. Saxon Home Realty Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 152 (App. Div. 
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Additionally, the PCDA includes the “opt-out” option, which 
allows sellers to pay their way out of being responsible.419  Under this 
provision, sellers need only to provide purchasers with a credit of five-
hundred-dollars to free themselves from liability.420  The only way in 
which sellers could subject themselves to liability under this provision 
is if they actively and willfully concealed the true conditions of the 
property.421   
To create a more uniform and effective statute, New York 
should impose a liability credit of one-half percent of the property 
value to cover the costs of inspections and remedies, rather than a 
uniform five-hundred-dollar credit.  The doctrine of caveat emptor 
further emphasizes the purchaser’s need to exercise due diligence.  The 
credit, on the other hand, will provide for compensation to the 
purchaser to release the seller from any remaining responsibility to 
disclose defects.  Passage of legislation incorporating these policies 
would create a healthy balance between seller and purchaser, without 
having the scale tip to one side or the other.  While it is imperative to 




2d Dep’t 1998); Belizaire v. Keller Williams Landmark II, 111 N.Y.S.3d 800 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Cty. 2018). 
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